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Case No. 8343 
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
STATEMENT· OF Fk0T8 
This action was brought in the District Court for 
Weber County by Hance A. Taylor and E'rma G. Taylor, 
his wife, and Parley P. Taylor, the owners of two adjo~n­
ing tracts of land, over which the defendant, Weber 
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County, sought to acquire, oYer a period of years a right 
to drain a large quantity of water and to clean and en-
large a drainage ditch. The County, through its Com-
missioners, had negotiated for some time with plaintij'l's 
for pennission to conduct the water from a ponded area 
or swmnp north of Center Street in Plain City, Utah, 
which water had backed up against and over a newly 
constructed highway, through the drainage ditch con-
structed by the predecessors of plaintiffs. 
The plaintiffs during these negotiations had resisted 
the claim of the County that the drain through plaintiffs' 
property was a natural one, and had further resisted 
the claim of the County that it had acquired rights to use 
and do work on the drain ·by moving in a dragline or other 
machinery and enlarging and deepening the drain to 
handle an increased flow of water. 
On the 20th day of November, 1953, after negotia-
tions had failed, the defendants, Graham, Griffin, and 
Nielsen, under the direction of the defendants: County 
Commissioners Hess, Brown and Carver, cut the fence 
of Hance A. Taylor, and with a large draglinc moved 
onto his property and cleaned and deepened the drain, al-
though express permission to enter said property had 
been repeatedly denied the County and its agents by Mr. 
Taylor. 
Because of the refusal of the T-aylors to give per-
mission to the County, the Sheriff of Weber County was 
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3 
directed ·by the Commissioners to go to the Taylor farm 
and stand guard while the dredge line was passed over 
the fence and taken down through the drainage ditch 
area, over a second fence into Parley P. Taylor's farm, 
then back again through the ditch across the property of 
plaintiffs, through the fence again and out. 
This action was grounded in trespass for damages 
and for a permanent injunction against further trespass 
and the use of the Taylor properties hy the County or its 
agents. 
The answer of the defendants to this action in its 
essence was a general deniaf, but at the pre-trial confer-
ence the defendants were required to set out a state-
ment of facts which they expected to prove at the trial. 
This statement indicates that defendants relied upon 
their having acquired a right of way over the plaintiffs' 
land by prescription, or natural right of drainage, which 
right of way included the right to go onto the T'aylor 
farms a11d clean the drain. Plaintiffs' complaint was 
amended?to inc'lude an allegation of punitive damages 
based on the deliberate and intentional forceable entry 
"· of the Taylor farms by the defendants in open defiance 
of the plaintiffs' rights. 
At the trial plaintiffs introduced evidence of their 
ownership of the land in question, established the force-
ful entry of their properties 'by the defendants, and fur-
ther introduced evidence of the resultant damage to their 
farms. 
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The p1aintiffs introduced as Exhibit C the photo-
graph set out herein, showing the condition of the drain 
as left by the dragline, and the plaintiff, Hance A. 
Taylor, measuring the depth of the drain aftPr the 
County had finished its dredging operation and had 
thrown along the sides of the ditch bank the materials 
ae('umulated in the 'bottom of the drain. 
The ownership of the property by plaintiffs was es- ~~ · 
tablished without contradictory testimony, and the esti-
mate of the damage done by the trespass with its at-
tendant results of cutting and washing away plaintiffs' 
ground was not controverted by the defendants. 
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5 
Defendants' evidence at the trial was directed to a 
showing that the drain had not been appreciably enlarged 
by the recent dredging operation. Evidence was also in-
troduced by the defendants, apparently in an effort to 
establish the claimed right of way to maintain the drain 
across plaintiffs' farms. Defendants' evidence was in-
tended to show that the drain was viewed by the County 
as a necessary channel through which to divert water 
which had accumulated in a pond north of Center Street 
and which had, during the spring of the year, overflowed 
onto the highway (T. 106, 130). No evidence was intro-
duced to the effect that the drain across plaintiffs' farms 
was.the natural drain for the pond area. 
Lester England, a witness for defendants, testified 
to the effect that in his youth he had heard his father, 
now deceased, say that the Englands had purchased 
the right to go onto the Taylor farm and clean the drain, 
and had at one time paid a predecessor of Hance A. and 
Parley P. Taylor, the sum of $20.00 for the right to use 
the draiil, (T. 187). 
l 
Defindants further attempted to show that on vari-
ous occasions through the years County employees had 
cleaned the drain. Lester England testified that around 
1918 the Taylor drain had been cleaned by one Louis 
Shummers, a County employee (T. 191, 192). Mr. 
England admitted on cross-examination that he re-
membered when the ''drain" was just a "swale" through 
the plaintiffs' farms (T. '216). Witness Delwin Sharp 
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for the defendants, testified that in 1918 as Road Super-
visor of vV e:ber County, he had directed the deepening 
of the 'raylor drain and the putting in of a culvert under 
a canal north of the T~aylor farms ( T. 227). His testi-
mony was that he had hired John H. Taylor, the father 
of the plaintiff, Hance A. Taylor, to assist in this work 
(T. 229). A County employee, Ernest Jensen, testified 
that he operated a dragline on the Taylor properties in 
1928 ( T. 2315). Witness Jesse Singleton testified that he 
personally cleaned the drain in 1933 as Road Super-
visor (T. 244) at which time he saw no one and spoke to 
no one on the Taylor farms ('T. 255), and further testi-
fied that in 1935 he knew of work being done on the drain 
by the P.W.A. as part of a mosquito abatement project 
(T. 245). Again in 1938 Singleton hired plaintiff Parley 
P. Taylor and his son to dig out the cattails from the 
drain (T. 247), and, finally, in '1943 he again.cleaned the 
drain with a drag line ( T. 25'1), but on cross-examination 
he stated that on this occasion he did not enter the Parley 
P. Taylor farm ('T. 257). None of defendants' witness-
es testified that they had gone onto the Taylbr farms 
without seeking permission of the T'aylors to do so. 
Plaintiffs' re:buttal was to the effect that the drain 
was constructed by the Taylors in 19113 or 1914 (T. 283) 
by means of a slip scraper and plow, and that the drain 
at that time was not more than a foot deep (T. 284). 
The drain had originally been constructed to· relieve the 
land of excess water, when the snow would melt and the 
Plain City canal broke (T. 283, 31'2), and at that time 
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7 
carried no water fr01n the pond north of Center Street. 
Plaintiffs' rebuttal further showed that in 19'28, County 
Commissioner Randal had promised the Taylors that 
if they would let the County clean the drain, the County 
would tile it at a later time (T. 286). Permission was 
given the P.W.A. to enter the Taylor farms because of 
the mosquito project and the obvious resultant benefit 
to the properties to be rid of the 1nosquito nuisance ( T. 
288). Again in 1943 Commissioner McEntire promised 
the Taylors that if permission were given the County to 
enter the farms, the County would tile the drain (T. 290). 
This was not denied by defendants. Permission was ac-
cordingly given, hut conditioned on the tiling, which never 
did occur. A meeting of the County Commissioners and 
interested farmers occurred at the County Building in 
1948, and at that time the County Commissioners again 
expressed the desire to acquire a right of way through 
the T·aylor farms in exchange for tiling (T. '292). The 
cost of tiling was considered, and proved to be in excess 
of what. the Commissioners felt they could expend, and 
no further progress was made in that regard. 
Mrs. U rie, mother of Hance A. Taylor, testified that 
in 1943, at which time she owned the Hance A. Taylor 
farm, she gave the County permission to clean the drain 
if they would tile it ('T. 301). She further testified that 
she had previously given the P.W.A. permission to enter 
the farm and clean the drain as part of the mosquito 
a:batement project (T. 301). 
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8 
Conunissioner Carver, called by defendants, testified 
on cross-exmnination to the effect that Weber County 
cleaned the Taylor drain in November, 1953, and that 
the Com1nissioners were not at that time acting under 
the direction of farmers in the vicinity. 
At the close of all the evidence plaintiffs moved for 
a directed verdict as to liability (T. 333) on the ground 
that it was undisputed that the County had forcefully 
entered the plaintiffs' farms and cleaned the drains with-
out plaintiffs' permission, and further upon the ground 
that defendants had introduced no clear and satisfactory 
evidence to support the right of way claimed. Plaintiffs' 
motion was denied and the matter was submitted to the 
jury on special interrogatories and a general verdict. 
The jury answered in the affirmative Interrogatory 
No. 1, which read as follows : 
"Do you find from the evidence that Weber 
County on November 20, 195'3, had a right of way 
across the plaintiffs Ranee .A. Taylor, ,Erma G. 
Taylor and Parley P. T·aylors' land for the pur-
pose of draining water, through the drain then 
existing on plaintiffs' land and for cleaning and 
maintaining that water drain~ .Answer yes or no." 
The verdict of the jury was for defendants and against 
plaintiffs, no cause of action. 
On March 30, 195·5, this appeal was taken from the 
judgment of the trial court based upon the general ver-
dict and the jury's answers to the special interrogatories. 
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STATEMENT OF POINTS 
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HIS REFUSAL TO 
GRANT PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR A DIRECTED VER-
DICT AS TO LIABILITY AT THE CLOSE OF ALL THE 
EVIDENCE. 
II. THE TRIAL ·COURT ERRED IN HIS INSTRUCTION 
NO. 3 WHICH QUOTES VERBATIM FROM THE DEFEND-
ANTS' PRE-TRIAL STATEMENT AS TO THEORIES OF DE-
FENSE WHICH ARE NOT SUBSTANTIATED BY ANY EVI-
DENCE IN THE CASE. 
III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HIS INSTRUCTION 
NO. 6, SETTING FORTH "BASIC PRINCIPLES OF DRAIN-
AGE LAW." 
IV. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HIS INSTRUCTIONS 
NO. 13, THERE BEING NO EVIDENCE AT ALL IN THE 
RECORD TO SUPPORT THE INSTRUCTION. 
V. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HIS REFUSAL TO 
SUSTAIN PLAINTIFFS' OBJECTIONS TO THE TESTIMONY 
OF WITNESS LESTER ENGLAND, AND FURTHER ERRED 
IN REFUSING PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO STRIKE THE 
TESTIMONY OF WITNESS LESTER ENGLAND AS TO 
CERTAIH MATTERS. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HIS REFUSAL TO 
GRANT PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR A DIRECTED VER-
DICT AS TO LIABILITY AT THE CLOSE OF ALL THE 
EVIDENCE. 
The evidence of the defendants failed to sustain 
any one of the theories advanced at pre-trial by which 
the County claimed to have acquired a right of way over 
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10 
plaintiffs' far1ns. The record discloses no testimony 
whatsoever concerning the Taylor drain being the ''na-
tural drain" for the area north of Center Street. On 
the contrary all the evidence concerning the origin of the 
Taylor drain is to the effect that it was originally con-
structed by the predecessors of the Taylors by slipseraper 
and plow in approxi111ately the year 1913 to relieve the 
inm1ediate area of surplus water. Defendants' witnesses 
testified that the pond north of Center Street was located 
in a "saucer-like" area into which water from the sur-
rounding land flowed, but there was no direct testimony 
that the natural course of drainage from that "saucer-
like" area was through the Taylor farms. Rather, de-
fendants' evidence was that the natural drainage was 
to the North (T. 195 ). Defendants' evidence did not 
controvert that the County was attempting to appropri-
ate a private drain owned by the Taylors for public use, 
due to an alleged emergency situation resulting from the 
accumulation of water north of the Center Street high-
way. 
A second theory found in defendants' pre-trial state-
ment is that the County had acquired a right, of way 
through some general use over the period of years. This 
''general use" was sought to be substantiated by testi-
mony that some farmers in the immediate vicinity had 
used the Taylor drain and, in fact, had purchased the 
right to use it from Hance A. Taylor's father. Such evi-
dence is clearly immaterial since any right acquired by 
farmers in the area or by the "general community" could 
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11 
not give the 8ounty a right in the a:bsence of an express 
grant, and no such grant to the County was ever claimed 
or suggested by the evidence. Further, the County, 
through its Commissioner Carver, admitted that it was 
not the agent of someone else in cleaning the drain. At 
page 324 of the transcript occurs the following on recross-
examination of the witness Carver: 
RECROSS EXAMINATION 
BY MR. CHRISTENSEN: 
Q. Are you saying now, Mr. Carver, the reason 
you sent that dragline through there is be-
cause the people north of Center Street told 
you to~ 
A. Oh, no. I don't do that. 
Q. It had nothing to do with it at all~ And if the 
drain needed cleaning, you would have cleaned 
it whether anyone told you to or not~ 
A. I think so, yes. 
Q. 'The fact that the people returned there telling 
you to clean the drain, that doesn't make any 
difference~ 
A. Yes, I think it does. When a lot of people are 
complaining. 
Q. It's sort of a public relation job~ 
A. No. We like to do the things that should be 
done at the time it's needed. 
Q. Well, did you rely on what these people told 
you as to whether or not this drain needs 
cleaning~ 
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12 
A. Oh, no. We go look at it after they come in. 
Q. You were not cleaning it for them~ 
A. No. 
Q. You were relying on them to determine 
whether or not it needed to be cleaned~ 
A. We were cleaning it for Weber County. 
Q. You use your own judg1nent in those matters, 
don't you~ 
A. Yes. 
Defendants' theory that the right of way had been 
acquired by prescriptive use over a twenty year period 
prompted the introduction of testimony through many 
witnesses of instances where Weber County through its 
employees had gone onto the Taylor farms and cleaned 
the drains. This evidence when read in conjunction with 
cross-examination and rebuttal testimony conclusively 
shows that on each and every oecasion when defend-
ants entered the Taylor farm for the purpose ~~f clean-
ing the drain, permission was sought and obtained or the 
entry was made without the plaintiffs' knowledge. This 
Court has frequently observed that the testimony of a 
witness is no stronger than it remains after cross-exami-
nation. Further, the cleaning in recent years was there-
sult of a conditional permission given by the Taylors to 
the County if it would tile the drain and thus prevent 
its further enlargement. It was never adverse or under 
claim of right. 
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An element necessary for acquiring a right of way 
by prescriptive use is adverse user, or a continued use 
under claim of right with the acquiescence of the owner 
of the servient estate. Bertolina v. Frates, 89 Ut. 238, 
57 P. (2d) 346; Jen1sen v. Gerrard, 85 Ut. 481,39 P. (2d) 
1070. ·~his element is entirely lacking in the evidence. 
There can be no acquiescence by the landowners in the 
absence of knowledge that someone is attempting to ac-
quire a right of way over their property. There was no 
claim of right on the County's part as witness the per-
mission consistently sought. Further, there can be no 
adverse user when the evidence shows that permission 
has been unconditionally or conditionally given for each 
separate entry upon the servient estate by that party who 
seeks to create the easement. 
Since defendants introduced no testimony to contro-
vert the ownership of the Taylor farms or the forcea:ble 
entry by Weber County, it became their burden to show 
that the-entry was under some claim of right. This they 
sought to do by introducing evidence to the effect that a 
right of"' way had been acquired by prescription. Their 
burden in this regard is that they must establish their 
claim by ''clear and convincing evidence," Buckley v. 
Cox, 274 P. (2d) 277 (Utah, 1952), or "clear and satis-
factory evidence," Jensen v. Gerra,rd, Supra. See also 2 
Tiffany on Real Property, 2nd Ed., Sec. 519', page 2046. 
We submit that the evidence of defendants was not of 
that quality required by the Utah cases. 
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II. THE TRIAL ·COURT ERRED IN HIS INSTRUCTION 
NO. 3, WHICH QUOTES VERBATIM FROM THE DEFEND-
ANTS' PRE-TRIAL STATEMENT AS TO THEORIES OF DE-
FENSE WHICH ARE NOT SUBSTANTIATED BY ANY EVI-
DENCE IN THE CASE. 
The trial court in his Instruction No. 3 charged the 
jury as follows: 
''To this cmnplaint, the defendants answered 
admitting they entered the land in question, but 
alleging that they did so lawfully as and for 
Weber County * * *" 
The instruction goes on to recite four theories which 
the defendants had proposed, any one of which they felt 
would justify a finding of the acquisition of a right of 
way. Paragraphs one, two and three of this instruction 
are verbatim quotes from the defendants' pre-trial state-
Inent of facts and none of the instruction finds any sup-
port in competent evidence. Paragraph 2, containing 
the statement that the people of the comm.'WYIJity had main-
tained the drain for 35 to 40 years or more, alleges facts 
which, if true, would be immaterial. The balance of para-
graph 2 relating to the maintenance of the drain iby 
Weber County, while gaining some support from the 
evidence, yet, if true, would not in and of itself support 
a finding that a right of way had been created, absent 
adverse use or acquiescence for twenty years to a claimed 
right. Savage v. Nielsen, 114 Ut. 2·2, 197 P. (2d) 117. 
Paragraph 3 of the instruction, as previously discussed, 
is supported, if at all, by evidence in the form of hearsay 
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testimony by one Lester England. Further, such ervi-
dence, if admissible, could not create a right of way in 
vVe~ber County, absent a grant from 0. G. Swenson and 
Lester England's father or their successors in interest 
to the County. 
In Bruner v. McCarthy, et al., 105 Utah 399, 142 P. 
(2d) 649, Justice Wolfe discusses at length the matter 
of a trial court's reading to the jury the pleadings in a 
case. At page 413, of the Utah Report, he states: 
"There is nothing inherently erroneous in 
reading the pleadings in order to present the is-
sues. If they are concise, well drawn, and present 
the issues sharply where there is evid~ence mate-
rial to each issue, it may be that the court could 
not improve upon them as a method of stating 
the position of each side." (Italics ours.) 
Justice Wolfe goes on to cite earlier Utah cases in 
which it had been held prejudicial error for a verbatim 
statement of the complaint, answer or reply to be given 
the jury-1s part of their instructions, such statements be-
ing too often misleading and prejudicial. Among other 
cases Ju.stice Wolfe quotes from Farmers and Mercharnt's 
Savings Bank v. Jensen, 64 Utah 609, 232 P. 1084 wherein 
the Supreme Court held that : 
"The court in the written charge should itself 
clearly define the particular issue or issues suJb-
mitted to the jury and should specifically state to 
them the material facts alleged, denied and ad-
mitted in respect to such issues. (Citing cases.) 
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But upon appeal prejudice will not be presumed 
simply fron1 a showing that the trial court failed to 
construe the pleadings and to charge the jury up-
on the issues. The burden rests upon the com-
plaining party to go further and point out to this 
court wherein and in what respect he has been 
prejudiced by such error on the part of the trial 
court. Davis v. Hiener, 54 Utah 428, 181 P. 587." 
Justice \Volfe then continues: 
"While most jurisdictions frown on the prac-
tice of using the language of the various pleadings 
to summarize the issues for the jury, the rule that 
reading the pleadings may or may not be error 
seems to meet with general approval. 
~'It has been held prejudicial error to read 
parts of pleadings relating to issues upon which no 
evidence has been introduced, Hines v. Gale, 25 
Arizona 65, 213 P. 395. * * *" 
It is submitted that the trial court in quoting at 
length in Instruction No. 3 from the defendants' pre-trial 
statement of facts (R. 26) committed the vttry error 
Justice Wolfe discusses, i.e., the reading of parts of plead-
ings relating to issues upon which no evidence jo,s been 
introduced. This is clearly true of paragraphs one and 
four, and part of paragraph two of this instruction. Cer-
tainly any jury of laymen, whose responsibility it was to 
determine whether a right of way existed, would become 
confused at the court's suggestion that four possible 
theories existed and were supported by the evidence upon 
which they could find the acquisition of a right of way by 
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Weber County over the farm lands of the Taylors. That 
which holds true for the reading of pleadings as part of 
a court's instructions would likewise hold true for the 
reading of a party's pre-trial statement as part of the 
instructions. Thus, as stated in Shields v. Utah Light and 
Traction Co., 99 Utah 307, 315; 105 P. ('2d) 347, 
"vVe conclude that the reading of the long and 
involved complaint to the jury as part of the 
charge was error, not altogether corrected by the 
mere admonition that the foregoing is not to be 
construed as evidence but merely sets forth the 
claims of plaintiff." 
For further references on the question whether an 
instruction in the absence of evidence to support it 1s 
error, see plaintiffs' Assignment of Error No. IV. 
III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HIS INSTRUCTION 
NO. 6, SETTING FORTH "BASIC PRINCIPLES OF DRAIN-
AGE LAW." 
The trial court's instruction No. 6 intended to ''be 
helpful" in stating ''a few of the basic principles of law 
governing drainage problems" erroneously states the law 
with respect to the acquisition of a prescriptive right. 
Paragraph four of this instruction sets forth in 
Hornbook fashion what the law 'books refer to as "the 
lost grant theory." The writer at 17 American J'urispru-
dence, Easements, Section 55, discusses the origin of 
easements by prescription and in the following words 
states how the theory grew up in our law: 
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"Easements may be created hy prescription 
or, more properly speaking, under the modern 
doctrine, by presu1nption. Theoretieally, statutes 
of limitations apply only to actions for the re-
covery of land as distinguished from incorporeal 
hereditaments, such as easements. An easement 
clai1ned in the land of another cannot be the sub-
ject of a constant, exclusive, and adverse posses-
sion su~h as is requisite to assert the bar of limit-
ations. Thus, originally in England, easements, 
as incorporeal hereditaments, were said to lie 
wholly in grant, and statutes of limitation were 
held to apply only to actions for the recovery of 
land. In time the fiction of a "lost grant" was 
adopted by the courts ; that i ~, the courts pre-
sumed, from the long possession and exercise of 
right by the defendant with the acquiescence of 
the owner, that there must have been originally 
a grant by the owner to the claimant which must 
have been lost." 
In reading the instructions of the court as a whole, 
it would seem that this "lost grant" theory of Instruction 
No. 6 is something entirely different than the adverse 
use theory discussed in Instruction No. 9. Both, how-
ever, are concerned with the acquisition of a right of way 
by prescription. Again, the element obviously missing 
in paragraph four of this instruction, is that of adverse 
use, or in the alternative, acquiescence by the servient 
land owner in the acts of the party seeking to establish 
the right of way under claim of right. See Smith v. North 
Canyon Water Compawy, 16 Ut. 194, at page 202, 52 P. 
283, where the court discusses the elements necessary to 
prove the acquisition of a water right by prescription. 
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Since those very elements were not proved by the defend-
ants at the trial as shown heretofore, Instruction No. 6 
was not only an erroneous statement of the law, but, even 
if correctly and completely stated, was not supported 
by the evidence. 
IV. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HIS INSTRUCTION 
NO. 13, THERE BEING NO EVIDENCE AT ALL IN THE 
RECORD TO SUPPORT THE INSTRUCTION. 
Instruction No. 13 is an instruction wholly without 
support in the evidence. The Instruction reads as follows : 
"If you find that 0. G. Swenson and Lester 
England's father purchased from John Taylor, the 
prior owner of plaintiffs' lands, the right to allow 
the water from their places to be drained through 
the drain across plaintiffs' land and the right to 
maintain such a drain, and if you find that Lester 
and Merl England are successors in interest to 
the land being continuously drained since that 
time through the drain in question, so as to have 
a prescriptive right as elsewhere defined, and if 
you find that Weber County was requested and 
instructed by said En glands shortly prior to No-
vember 20, 1953, to clean out said drain in their 
behalf and as their agent, then you are instructed 
that said We'ber County was not a trespasser 
when it did so, but that the right to so act would 
not exceed the right of England would have had 
and if the act did so, they would be trespassers 
to the extent not justified by the right." 
It will be seen that the Instruction, in substance, is one 
on the theory of agency, and as heretofore stated, the 
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County expressly denied at the trial, through its Com-
missioner Carver, that it was acting for anyone but 
Weber County, in the cleaning of the Taylor drain No- 1 
ve1nber 20, 1953. A clear statement of the scope of in-
structions is found at 64 Corpus Juris 760, where it is 
stated: 
''Instructions should be confined to the issues 
presented by the evidence. Where there is no evi-
dence upon an issue, failure to instruct upon, or 
to present it, is not error. On the contrary, in-
structions on issues not r·aised by th1e evidence or 
directly opposed to the evidence are erroneous, 
G/nd properly refused although they ar;e correct 
as abstract propositions of law and although the 
issues are raised through the ple..adings; and it is 
error to refuse to eliminate an issue made by the 
pleadings when there is no evidence to support it. 
If an instruction not warranted by the evidence 
is calculated to mislead the jury and prejudice 
the objecting party, it is ground for a reversal; 
* * * (Italics ours)." 
The reason for carefully guarding the giving of in-
structions upon which there is no evidence, is found at 
14 Ruling Case Law 736, where the statement is made: 
"If an instruction is not thus based on the 
evidence, it is erroneous in that it introduces for 
the jury facts not presented thereby, and it is well 
calculated to mislead and in.duce them to suppose 
that such a state of facts in the opinion of the 
court w1as possible under the evidence, and might 
be considered by them." (Italics ours.) 
In the case of State Bank of Beaver Co'UJYI,.ty v. Hol-
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lingshead, 82 rtah 416, 25 P. (2d) 612, at page 432, of the 
Utah Reports, the Supreme Court of Utah discusses 
this question as follows : 
''It is proper and generally necessary for the 
court in its instructions to submit to the jury the 
theory of the case as presented by the defendant 
as well as that presented by the plaintiff. It is 
necessary, however, that whatever theories are 
presented by pleadings or otherwise, in order to 
be entitled to be submitted by way of instructions 
to the jury, some evidence must have been received 
by the court in support of such theory. Instruc-
tions to a jury must be responsive to the issues and 
of such nature that they are applicable to the evi-
dence received and submitted to the jury." 
In that case the court found that there was no evidence 
supporting part of an instruction and on that basis, as 
well as other errors, reversed the holding of the trial 
court and returned the case for a new trial. 
A more recent pronouncement by Justice Wolfe, con-
curring in the case of Clawson v. Walgreen Drug Com-
pany, 108 Utah 577, 162 P. (2d) 759, is found at page 
593: 
"I note a change in the policy of this court in 
regard to determining whether inapplicable in-
structions are prejudicial. In earlier days, this 
court held that an inapplicable instruction would 
be presumed to be prejudicial unless it clearly ap-
peared that it could not have been so. (Citing 
cases.) Of late, and in this case, we have held 
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that an instruction not applicable to any evidence 
will be presu1ned to have been ignored by the jury. 
This 1neans that we will assmne that the jury rx-
ercised 1nore discrimination than the judge. Cer-
tainly I am not one to hold that the mere giving 
of abstract instructions not applicable to any evi-
dence necessarily constitutes prejudicial error. 
Trial judges under the pressures put upon them 
by jury trials give instructions at the time thought 
to be applicable, which we, in a careful survey 
1nay find inapplicable." 
Justice vVolfe goes on to state that there are two 
types of inapplicable instructions. One is the harmless 
kind, which a jury could reasonably ignore. The other 
kind is discussed by J'ustice Wolfe at page 596: 
"This case presents an example of one erron-
eous instruction which may be held not prejudi-
cial. I refer to that instruction in respect to what 
I consider a non-applicable ordinance hitherto 
considered. It also presents in the instruction be-
ing presently considered an excellent example of 
one which is prejudicial. 
"The mind of the jury would be pointedly di-
rected to the fact that the judge considered that 
there was evidence from which it could be con-
cluded that the plaintiff had fallen into the vault 
because of lack of protection from the South Side. 
The instruction was actually calculated to do that. 
Yet the accident definitely was caused by the 
plaintiff not falling into the hole, but actually 
walking against a raised barrier, falling over it-
an act in itself strongly indicative of lack of care 
for his own protection. To divert the mind of the 
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jury fron1 a chain of circun1stances which culmin-
ated in the accident to a false chain on which could 
be predicated a conclusion of different and per-
haps greater culpability on the part of the defend-
ant when both true and false chains themselves 
were so closely connected with the same physical 
object and the manner in which the accident hap-
pened may, with great likelihood, have influenced 
the jury to base a conclusion on the supposed more 
culpable delict. The differences between the two 
situations may at first appear trivial but upon 
reflection may reveal a very marked difference 
* * * Their minds may too easily, without a wrong 
instruction to help them, import into the situation 
a fall into the unprotected hole, rather than a 
blind stumbling over an obstacle and their verdict 
reached accordingly. Add to that probability an 
instruction which is predicated on the misstep into 
the hole rather than the fall over a door and the 
likelihood that they were influenced by it is very 
greatly magnified. * • *" 
The above reasoning applies with equal force in the 
instant case. The jury were to decide by answering the 
special interrogatories with the aid of instructions, 
whether Weber County was upon the plaintiffs' farms by 
any legal right. The instructions contain several the-
ories which, if supported by the evidence, might have 
given Weber County and its employees a legal right of 
way over the Taylor drain. But the record reveals that 
no one theory is supported by the evidence, and most 
decidedly, the theory of agency. Instruction No. 13, set-
ting forth a separate theory which defendants unsuccess-
fully attempted to bolster by evidence, tends only to con-
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fuse the jury, or, at best, to suggest to them, without 
supporting facts, an additional theory upon which they 
can justify the County's entrance upon the Taylor farms. 
The likelihood that the jury were influenced by it is high-
ly probable and the giving of the instruction was thus, 
prejudicial to plaintiffs. 
V. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HIS REFUSAL TO 
SUSTAIN PLAINTIFFS' OBJECTIONS TO THE TESTIMONY 
OF WITNESS LESTER ENGLAND, AND FURTHER ERRED 
IN REFUSING PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO STRIKE THE 
TESTIMONY OF WITNESS LESTER ENGLAND AS TO 
CERTAIN MATTERS. 
The trial court permitted the defendants' witness, 
Lester England, to testify over objection concerning a 
staten1ent made by said witnesses' father, now deceased, 
many years before and in the absence of any of the plain-
tiffs of this case. The statement appears at page 189 of 
the transcript as follows: 
Q. What do you know about the transaction~ 
A. Just that my father told me. 
MR. CHRISTENSEN: I object to what his 
father told him. That isn't binding on us. 
Q. Maybe it is. 
MR. CHRISTENSEN: Then establish a 
foundation for it. 
Q. Where were you when your father made these 
statements to you~ 
J 
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A. Well, one time we were right here on this 
drain here. 
Q. Now, you are indicating what~ 
A. 'The main drain that goes through Taylors' 
places. 
Q. Yes. 
A. And he told me he said "they can't stop you 
from cleaning tha:t drain because we bought 
a right-of-way at one time." 
MR. CHRISTENSEN: I move the answer be 
stricken as not responsive to any question asked, 
and on the further ground that it's hearsay as to 
any of the parties to this-the plaintiffs in this 
case, no proper foundation for the admission at 
this time. 
THE COURT: The objection is overruled. 
It may remain. It shows hostile assertions to the 
T'aylors. 
MR. CHRISTENSEN: Your Honor, he 
hasn't shown that John Taylor was there. He 
hasn't shown the plaintiffs were there. He hasn''t 
shown it's a reputation. All he said is that it's 
shown that his father said that to him. I don't 
think that is material to this case. It's certainly 
hearsay. 
THE COURT: The matters you refer to-
I judge is what he has got is circumstantial evi-
dence of an adverse claim. 
,MR. CHRISTENSEN: Well one isolated 
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statement isn't any evidence of hostility or any-
thing else if it isn't a general reputation in that 
area. It's absolutely immaterial. 
The transcript reveals that at this point counsel for 
the Coun:ty stated that an exception to the ordinary hear-
say rule existed as a result of a whole series of boundary 
line and land cases before the time when surveyors were 
able to get out on the lands, based on some theory of law 
not stated in the record by counsel, and yet, an exception 
to the hearsay rule reportedly allowed ''in many English 
and A1nerican cases." We know of no such exception to 
the hearsay rule. If defendants' counsel refers to the ex-
ception treated at 5 Wigmore on Evidence ( 3rd Ed.) 
§ 1563, entitled "Declarations About Private Boundaries," 
it is submitted that no question of boundary existed in 
the instant case. 
This statement by the witness Lester England is 
clearly hearsay and should have been stricken by the 
court at the request of counsel for the plaintiffs. At page 
281 of the transcript, the trial court discusses and rules 
upon plaintiffs' motion to strike the entire testimony of 
Lester England with respect to the conversation between 
him and his father, as hearsay, there being no foundation 
showing that such knowledge as the father had was a part 
of the general knowledge of the com·munity. Counsel 
further objected that even if there were such a conversa-
tion it would relate to the right of Mr. England, that is, 
the witnesses' predecessor in title, and not to the rights 
of the defendants; and further o'bjected on the ground 
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that .Mr. Lester England's testimony relating to the pay-
ment of any money to John H. Taylor has no connection 
with the case since there is no showing that any of those 
rights had been assigned to the defendants in this case. 
The court states at page 281: 
"Insofar as this business a;bout conversa-
tions with Mr. England and his father, it's admis-
si'ble, if for no other purpose to show how Mr. 
England viewed the matter. I recognize the Eng-
land's do have a right, that there is no showing 
directly that the county has picked up his right 
and acted as his agent as such. There is some 
evidence of it, but it would affect damages any-
way. That water had a right to run down there. 
It had a right to run down there. He can't com-
plain if Weber County ran it down there at Mr. 
England's request, or whether Mr. England ran it 
down there. I think the evidence is admiss~ble 
'for many purposes. First you will be aible to 
argue to the jury the phases of it you have assert-
ed in here. 
"Why don't you bring this Wigmore with you 
tomorrow on this business about the rule of law." 
It is apparent from the above quotation that the trial 
court in his search for some basis for admitting the testi-
mony of Lester England, found none at all, and could 
only state in summary: 
•'I think the evidence is admissible for many 
purposes." 
Certainly the error of the trial court's refusal to 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
28 
strike this inadmissible testin1ony cannot be remedied 
by telling counsel : "You will be able to argue the jury 
the phases of it you have asserted in here." A reading 
of the record will readily disclose the harmful effect of 
Lester England's testimony to plaintiffs' case. This was 
the only witness through whom evidence was introduced 
concerning any right of way over the Taylor property 
purportedly acquired by others than the Taylors them-
selves. The jury, being permitted to speculate on this 
incmnpetent and inadmissible evidence, could readily 
jun1p to the conclusion that if a grant of a right of way 
were given by the Taylors' predecessors to the Englands, 
possibly through some mysterious means, it could have 
descended to Weber County. We submit thai the failure 
to strike this testimony from the record constituted 
prejudicial error. 
The court's instructions were misleading and con-
fusing to the jury and contained erroneous statements of 
law. Further, the court suggested to the jury theories 
of defense entirely unsupported by the evidence in the 
case. Finally, the court adn1itted into evidence and re-
fused to strike testimony clearly hearsay and immaterial 
to the issue as to whether Weber County had acquired a 
right of way by prescription, by grant, or otherwise, and 
which testimony was highly prejudicial to plaintiffs. 
The cumulative effect of these errors was to deprive 
the plaintiffs of a fair and impartial trial, with the re-
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sultant effect that the plaintiffs have been unlawfully de-
prived of their right of private property by the action 
of Weber County. 
It is respectfully submitted that the judgment should 
be reversed and a new trial ordered with instructions to 
direct a verdict for plaintiffs on the issue of liability and 
permanently enjoining any further trespass on plaintiffs' 
lands by We'ber County. 
Respectfully submitted, 
SKEEN, THURMAN, 
WORSLEY & SNOW 
and H. G. OHRIS:T'ENS'EN 
Attorneys for .dppellClftls. 
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